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1 Introduction
We are interested in estimating how changes in crime impact property prices across different
periods of time and distances. We assess this impact by examining crime measured over
different distances in order to ask, “What do property owners consider near?” Secondly, we
examine crime that occurs over different periods of time in order to ask, “What do property
owners consider recent?” We examine the impact of crime by looking at data from the cities
of Denver, Colorado and Seattle, Washington.
Previous literature has found that crime negatively affects housing prices (Ihlanfeldt and
Mayock, 2010). Other papers emphasize the perception of future crime based on past behav-
ior by examining when a sex offender moves into, and then out of, a neighborhood. These
studies measure the impression of a ‘‘rise in risk’’ of crime in the neighborhood using the
precise time and location of a sex offender’s arrival (increase risk) and departure (reduction
of the risk). Housing prices respond by decreasing in areas near to where a sex offender
(risk) has moved (Linden and Rockoff, 2008; Pope, 2008). A sex offender moving into the
neighborhood is a rare event compared to number of crimes. Our paper explores the impact
of all types of crime on property prices.
We measure increased risk around properties using a nonparametric measures of spatial
concentration in order to account for the effects of crime on residential property prices; in
particular, we focus on the concentration of crime around a property sold at a given point in
time. This procedure creates property specific measures of crime. This method overcomes
limitations when using crime data aggregated using arbitrary boundaries including zip code,
city, and census block boundaries. Furthermore, by varying the length of time over we use to
create the concentration measure, we can determine the persistence of the impacts of crime
on property prices.
Results suggest that some crimes, including public disorder and automobile theft, nega-
tively affect property prices. As expected, the impact of crime decreases when crime concen-
tration is measured over large distances. We analyze two cities, Seattle and Denver, and find
that the effect varies across cities. A one-standard-deviation increase in crime concentration
decreases property prices between two percent to seven percent
In Section 2, we provide a summary of the relevant literature. Section 3 explains the
methodology applied, describes the data employed in our empirical analysis, and discusses
the main results. Finally, in section 4, we draw some conclusions.
2 Literature Review
The relationship between crime and housing prices has been extensively studied in previous
research by including measures of crime as an explanatory variables in a hedonic model (Ih-
lanfeldt and Mayock, 2010). These papers used a variety of variables in order to account
for crime intensity. Presumably, crime is thought to decrease the quality of the surrounding
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neighborhood. An increase in crime is expected to create disutility in the owner/resident of
the house. Additionally, as Gibbons (2004) explains, ‘’the spatial concentration of crime can
have dynamic effects driven by households, because their concentration increases the “fear
of crime” and discourages new home buyers from moving there. This creates a downward
spiral of the neighborhood’s quality.’’
The hedonic models have typically found evidence of a negative relationship between
crime rates and house prices (Thaler, 1978; Rizzo, 1979; Naroff et al., 1980; Taylor, 1995;
Lynch and Rasmussen, 2001; Bowes and Ihlanfeldt, 2001; Schwartz et al., 2003; Gibbons,
2004; Tita et al., 2006; Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2010). These papers emphasize the relation-
ship between an increase in crime and a decrease in property prices. However, a small number
of works have found insignificant correlations between crime and housing prices (Ridker and
Henning, 1967; Kain and Quigley, 1970). Furthermore, at least one study finds a positive
correlation (Case and Mayer, 1996).
The choice of how to measure of crime and which types of crime to use is important. In
studies of residential property, researchers have used a variety of variables including total
crime, property crime, violent crime, shopping center crime, assault and vandalism. The
choice of one type of crime over another is related to the expected disutility that the person
selling the house is facing. As Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2010) highlight, different crimes have
different impacts on house prices. Aggregating all crimes together by using an overall crime
rate would incorrectly assume that, ultimately, the measure of crime adequately represents
the expected disutility faced by homeowners when selling a property.
Choice of spatial unit in crime analysis is also crucial. Researchers have used different
areal units in their analyses including census tract, community, blocks, town, and precinct.
Arbia et al. (2015) points out that when using areal data “[any] conclusions are based on the
arbitrary definition of jurisdictional spatial units”. In other words, using different levels of
spatial aggregation can lead to different outcomes. Arbia (1989) defines this problem as the
“Modifiable Areal Unit Problem” (MAUP).
More recently, articles have proposed solutions to the MAUP when measuring the value
of amenities amenities, accessibility, or the presence of any characteristic that is related to
location. For example, when measuring the effect of accessibility on house prices, Baum-
Snow and Kahn (2000) use distance to rail stations. Baum-Snow and Kahn (2000) find
that reduced distance between census tract and rail transit is associated with an increase in
mean property price. Gibbons and Machin (2005) analyze the opening of a new subway line
extension in London. They find that properties where the distance between the nearest train
decreases experience an increase in house price. The change in price can also be affected
by expectations, as McMillen and McDonald (2004) find. McMillen and McDonald (2004)
estimates a model in which price changes after plans for a new line of rapid transit in Chicago
were released. Their analysis shows that property prices increase in locations where future
stations were anticipated, yet not formally announced.
(Pope, 2008; Linden and Rockoff, 2008) investigates the presence of a sex offender living
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in the neighborhood on property prices. In this study, there is an increase in “risk of crime”.
The presence of a sex offender was captured by a dummy variable that is assigned a value
of 1 if the registered offender lives within a specified distance from a property. The authors
find a negative and significant correlation with property price. Further, Pope (2008) find
that house prices revert to their previous levels when the sex offender moves.
In the above studies, there is a minimal risk that several sex offenders will live near each
other, and that the effects will cumulate. However, it is frequently the case that many crimes
can occur within a given area. In order to capture the cumulative effects of these crimes,
we incorporate methodologies from the urban agglomeration literature designed to solve the
MAUP. Several articles on agglomeration economies using micro data on establishment loca-
tions have shown the desired result (Duranton and Overman, 2005, 2008; Arbia et al., 2008;
Espa et al., 2010; Ellison et al., 2010; Nakajima et al., 2012). These studies use the firm
location when measuring firm concentration and apply the K-function developed in (Ripley,
1976). This analysis avoids the MAUP because it considers the specific location of each firm
and provides an un-biased measure of spatial concentration.
The K-function has been used in recent empirical studies by Ellison et al. (2010) and
Arbia et al. (2015). These authors propose constructing variables using K-function measures
of industrial concentration or agglomeration. Ellison et al. (2010) estimate the concentration
by sector, using this K-function variable as a dependent variable when testing for specific
sources of coagglomeration. Arbia et al. (2015) uses a local K-function applied to firm loca-
tion and uses this measure as an independent variable. Arbia et al. (2015) analyzes a hazard
function in order to test whether concentration is associated with firm attrition.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Econometric Approach
We are interested in measuring the concentration of crime around individual houses thus
avoiding the MAUP. We use the K-function to measure the presence and concentration of
crime in areas surrounding a property. Measuring crime at the property level is similar to the
approach taken by Gibbons (2004), Linden and Rockoff (2008), and Pope (2008). We propose
a variation of the K-function in order to measure local concentrations (Getis, 1984). A simi-
lar procedure was used by Arbia et al. (2015). The K-function in equation (1) measures the
standardized concentration of events located within a specific distance from a given property.
Ki(d, s) =
1
λs
E
[∑
j
I(dij ≤ d)I(s ≤ sij ≤ s+ s∗)
]
(1)
Where dij = ||li− lj|| and sij = ti− tj and 0 ≤ sij. The values li and lj denote the locations
of property i and crime j. The term dij is the distance in miles between property i and
crime j. The crimes included in the K-function are the crimes that are located within d
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miles of property i. The terms ti and tj are the dates of the sale for property i and the date
of crime j. The term sij measures the time between the sale and the crime. The restrictions
s ≤ sij ≤ s + s∗ imply that the K-function only includes crimes committed less than s∗
months prior to the sale.
The variables λs is the spatial intensity of crime between time periods s and s + s
∗ per
unit area. We calculate this as λs = 1|A|
∑
j I(s ≤ sij ≤ s + s
∗
). For two properties i and i′
sold at the same time, ti = ti′ , we will have sij = si′j,∀j and λis = λi′s. In other words, the
spatial intensity of crime is only determined by the date of sale. 1
The sale price of property i, pi is given by
pi = xiβ +
∑
s∈S
θdsKi(d, s) + i (2)
where xi is a vector of property attributes for property i, β is a vector of relative prices, and∑
s∈S θdsKi(d, s) = θdsKi(d, s) + θds+s∗Ki(d, s+ s
∗). The variable Ki(d, s) is the K-function
between the periods s and s+ s∗ , and we include the K-function for different periods.
We are only interested in using values of the K-function for a small number of d and
s. The distances should be small to more accurately reflect the property owner’s percep-
tion of crime. For this reason, we use D = {0.25miles, 0.5miles, 1mile}. Because real
estate cannot be sold immediately, we use S90 = {0, 90, 180, 270, 360} for s∗ = 90 days and
S180 = {0, 180, 360} for s∗ = 180 days. When using S90, the values in Ki(d, s) reflect changes
in the K-function over 90 day periods and likewise for S180.
In order to make interpretation of the K-function more straightforward, we modify the
formula. The modified K-function is now standardized by the distance that we use as the
threshold. This modification redefines the λ parameter to reconsider a variable unit area,
which means that when D takes any value, the unit area used to calculate λ is the area for
the threshold value. The output of the modified K-function will be based on the average
concentration for the specific area in which the K-function is calculated.
Ki(d, s) =
1
λd,s
E
[∑
j
I(dij ≤ d)I(s ≤ sij ≤ s+ s∗)
]
(3)
As an example, when s = 0 and s∗ = 90 days, Ki(d, 0) is the K-function for crimes 90
days prior to the sale, and Ki(d, 90) is the K-function for crimes 90-180 days prior to the
sale. The function Ki(d, s) is the K-function between the period. When Ki(d, s) > 1, crime
is more concentrated at distance d in locations near property i.
1For this reason, there is no subscript i on λs.
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3.2 Data Description
Crime and property transaction data used in this study come from the Denver and Seattle
cities. Denver property transaction data are available from the City and County of Denver
Assessment Division.2 King County (Seattle) transaction data are available from the King
County Assessor’s office.3 Denver crime data are available from the City and County of
Denver, Denver Police Department.4 Seattle crime data are the City of Seattle Police De-
partment incident reports.5 All data are available for public download.
Observations in the crime data sets include the location and date of the crime, as well
as its description. Crime categories in the two cities do not coincide. Therefore, we created
encompassing categories and sort crimes into categories based on the nature of the crime.
The scheme used to group each crime is listed in the appendix. Crime categories and counts
for Denver and Seattle are displayed in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
Crime data are reported at the city level. Because of this, we have excluded all transac-
tions in Denver County and King County that are not in the city of Denver or the city of
Seattle. The Denver County transactions data include the city, but King County data do
not include the city. Seattle properties are defined as any property within the city limit area.
Transaction data for Denver cover the period, 2008-2015. Transaction data in Seattle
cover the period 1990-2015. Each observation contains attribute information on the prop-
erty, sale date, sale price, and other variables of interest. The data are cleaned using reason-
able criteria in order to remove any non-arms-length transactions and outlying observations.
Summary statistics for the housing transactions for Denver and Seattle are displayed in Ta-
bles 3 and 4, respectively.
The crime data as will be explained in the empirical section of this paper, are used to
calculate a concentration index based on distance between the house sold and the crimes that
had occurred in a specified period before the sale. The estimated K-function will then rank
between 0 and a value that is higher than 1. Such values will explain if the concentration
of crime is lower than all the crimes in the city of analysis for the specified period. If the
number of crimes concentrated in the area is low with respect to the total distribution and
higher values then crime is concentrated around these areas. The behavior of the K-function
is shown in Figures 1 and 2. These charts reveal that some areas have a higher presence of
crimes and some are free of crimes. The patterns of orange (high crime concentration) and
blue (low crime concentration)are often in close proximity.
Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of K function results within half a mile distance
with a time period of 90 to 180 days before the sale of the dwelling and compares the
concentration inside a ZIP code area. The results show a pattern change between years in
2http://data.denvergov.org/dataset/city-and-county-of-denver-real-property-sales-and-transfers
3http://info.kingcounty.gov/assessor/DataDownload/default.aspx
4http://data.denvergov.org/dataset/city-and-county-of-denver-crime
5https://data.seattle.gov/Public-Safety/Seattle-Police-Department-Police-Report-Incident/7ais-f98f
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some of these ZIP codes. Some houses inside the ZIP code that are right next to each other
show bright blue and orange colors. Another impression given by the ZIP code contrast is
that crime rates are not constant in a one year time frame, and that issue might raise the
MAUP in the estimation.
3.3 Results
Our estimation strategy takes advantage of the temporal changes of crime in the neighboring
areas of a property. The occurrence of crimes within a certain distance of the house is not
constant for all areas. However, it is also important to consider timing. Crimes occurring
just prior to the sale should have the greatest impact on price. Obviously, crimes occurring
after the negotiation and agreement are not in the information set of the homeowner and
will not affect the selling price.
We estimate the model in equation (2). We will focus our discussion on the estimated
coefficients of the different K-function measures, which vary by crimes, distance, and spec-
ified period. Four tables of results are presented for each city (Denver and Seattle). These
four include one table for all crimes, crimes of public disorder, theft from motor vehicle,
and automobile theft. Each table has a section for three different K-functions, with rows
for different time frames. Each table has columns for three distances used. All regressions
include housing characteristics and year fixed effects.
As explained in the introduction, this analysis depends on the velocity of transactions for
dwelling sales and the speed with which the information flows. First, dwellings usually sell
more quickly during certain seasons of the year when more people move and likely sell more
quickly in more dynamic markets. Second, the speed of the spread of information among
people about nearby crimes. In addition, the persistence of information on factors such as
nearby crimes will affect house prices and sales volume.
We discuss our two cities separately. First we present the results for Denver and explain
the reasons for and implications of the different specifications. Then we will do the same for
Seattle.
3.3.1 Denver
Public disorder is the crime with greatest frequency in most years. Table 5 presents the OLS
results for Denver when the K-functions only consider public disorder crimes. The impact of
the K-functions declines almost uniformly as both the distance threshold and length of time
increase. Coefficients are statistically significant and negative for the smallest distances and
lengths of time. Coefficients decline in magnitude, eventually becoming insignificant as dis-
tances and time periods increase. In general, these results suggest that crime is not directly
related to the wealth of a neighborhood as noisy or unruly neighbors negatively affect house
prices.
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Table 6 shows results for theft from motor vehicles (carprowl), defined as the illegal
subtraction of property from a car. The coefficients of the K-functions are positive and
significant. For the most part, the impact decreases with distance as time frame increases.
The impact appears to increase again after nine months. The positive sign could indicate
that these kinds of crime signal a wealthy, high income neighborhood that might serve as an
attractor for crime but without a strong negative association with a large loss in property
prices.
Table 7 shows results for automobile theft. The crime concentration coefficients almost
always have a negative and significant coefficient. The coefficients are larger for smaller
distance thresholds. Interestingly, the coefficients initially become larger as time increases.
Table 8 shows results for Denver when all crimes are used. As intuition suggests, results
appear to become the average of the individual crime results. Very few estimated coefficients
are statistically significant outside those for 90-180 days. Comparing Table 8 results with
those for Tables 5, 6, and 7, provides further support for analyzing crimes on an individual
basis as opposed to aggregating all crimes together.
In Table 9, we summarize of a one standard deviation increase of the K-function on price.
Results indicate that dwelling prices decrease 1.8 percent for a one standard deviation in-
crease in all crimes within half a mile and 2.3 percent when the increase is within a quarter
of a mile. The comparable results for public disorder crimes are decreases of 5.95 percent
and 5.85 percent, respectively, for crimes within half a mile and within a quarter of a mile.
The effect from automobile theft is 7.5 percent for crimes within half a mile and 7.6 percent
for crimes within a quarter of a mile.
3.3.2 Seattle
Tables 11-14 present results for Seattle. Table 11 presents results for public disorder crimes
showing negative and significant coefficients when considering a threshold of a quarter of a
mile and half a mile, other than for the 180-270 day period. Effects appear to be larger and
more persistent in Seattle, compared with Denver.
Table 12 considers theft from motor vehicles. It is a very common crime in Seattle with
more than fifty thousand cases. As with Denver, coefficients are generally positively cor-
related with housing prices, perhaps reflecting attraction to wealthy areas where autos are
likely to have valuable property. This result is very similar to the results for Denver.
Automobile theft results are presented in Table 13. For the most part, results are similar
to those for Denver, most coefficients are negative and significant for the three distance pe-
riods considered, but with seemingly stronger and persistent effects. Coefficients are much
larger especially for longer time frames.
Once again, the “all crimes” model has a mix of results that are a mix of the individual
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crime results (Table 14). On average this model reflects the stronger, more persistent effects
for Seattle with mostly significant negative results for medium-to-long-term time frames.
Table 15 summarizes the effects on dwelling price of a one standard deviation increase
in the K-function. Results indicate that dwelling prices decrease 1.8 percent for a one stan-
dard deviation increase in all crimes within half a mile and 3.3 percent when the increase is
within a quarter mile. The comparable decrease for public disorder crimes are 4.85 percent
for crimes within half a mile and 6.47 percent for crimes within a quarter of a mile. The
effect from automobile theft is 5.0 percent for crimes within half a mile and 6.26 percent for
crimes within a quarter of a mile.
4 Conclusions
The analysis developed by Pope (2008) correctly identifies the timing and distance effect
of moving a sex offender to a neighboring area. However, other crimes also affect dwelling
price, and the time frame and distance impacts are difficult to estimate when the number
of crime events is large. Crime rates considered for some large fixed area such as county or
census tract lead to aggregation errors and result in biased estimates for the effect of crime
on property price. Considering the crime for a year or some other fixed period of time also
leads to estimation error. A crime included in estimating impacts may have occurred after
a house was sold or far in the past before a house was sold. As a result, this crime should
not impact property prices.
The analysis described in this paper addresses these two issues. We estimate the concen-
trations of crime at the property level taking into account the time frame of crime as well as
the distance between the crime and house. As the distance threshold for “nearness” increases,
the crime’s impact on property price changes, typically decreasing and eventually becoming
statistically insignificant for many cases. Time effects vary greatly depending on the type
of crime. For public disorder crimes, the strongest impact is for crimes occurring within 90
days before a property sells. This impact rapidly decreases rapidly for larger time frames.
For auto theft, impacts are more persistent and often appear stronger with longer lead times.
Finally, our results show that researchers cannot take a one-size-fits-all approach to es-
timated crime impacts on property price. First, crime impacts, accounting for distance and
time frame vary substantially across types of crime. Even where we find strong negative
impacts, such as for public disorder crimes and auto theft, the distance and time frame
impacts vary greatly. Other crimes, including theft from motor vehicle, do not even display
strong negative impacts. Using total crimes averages the impacts of individual crimes and
eliminates the most important information. Second, crime impacts vary across cities, while
Denver and Seattle display similar general patterns, the specific distance and time frame
patterns were quite different. In general, crime impacts were more persistent in Seattle even
though average impacts seemed similar.
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5 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Denver Crime Counts by Year
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Aggravated Assault 1169 1449 1487 1537 1600 680
Arson 129 93 92 96 130 38
Auto Theft 3286 3572 3431 3414 3506 1648
Burglary 4484 4707 4745 4826 4570 1848
Drug Alcohol 1815 1415 1721 4820 6067 2680
Larceny 5444 5983 6699 8456 9325 3402
Murder 33 43 33 40 33 21
Other Crimes Against Persons 1210 1419 1440 2638 3639 1502
Public Disorder 6361 6372 6133 8297 9730 3872
Robbery 957 1137 1216 1068 1075 443
Theft from Motor Vehicle 7228 7608 6649 6291 5121 2362
White Collar Crime 803 1095 957 855 1068 696
Table 2: Seattle Crime Counts by Year
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Aggravated Assault 1346 2391 2482 2555 4359 430
Arson 7 21 32 34 62 7
Auto Theft 2891 4979 4570 5250 10060 765
Burglary 3723 6552 6345 7081 11519 979
Drug Alcohol 1619 1981 1751 1509 1611 183
Larceny 6667 11552 12545 14441 23515 1969
Murder 10 10 10 19 22 1
Other Crimes Against Persons 221 474 375 419 611 48
Public Disorder 8249 13845 12813 13346 20444 1981
Robbery 675 1231 1276 1430 2305 237
Theft from Motor Vehicle 5416 9940 9227 11760 21426 1640
White Collar Crime 2747 3123 3489 3928 9466 472
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Denver Transactions
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Single Family Housing
PRICE ($1,000s) 25,981 391.163 397.346 0.499 33,500.000
BUILDING SQFT 25,981 1,592.505 847.496 226 8,964
LAND SQFT 25,981 6,998.306 3,002.211 0 97,125
BEDROOMS 25,981 2.816 0.816 1 11
BATHROOMS 25,981 2.133 0.943 1 9
SALE YEAR 25,981 2011.510 2.156 2008 2015
CONDO 25,981 0.000 0.000 0 0
Panel B: Condominium
PRICE ($1,000s) 8,778 182.696 159.428 0.499 2,725.000
BUILDING SQFT 8,778 1,113.364 437.439 219 5,700
LAND SQFT 8,778 1,837.833 1,539.400 150 20,800
BEDROOMS 8,778 1.821 0.606 1 5
BATHROOMS 8,778 1.569 0.588 1 6
SALE YEAR 8,778 2011.833 2.195 2008 2015
CONDO 8,778 1.000 0.000 1 1
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: Seattle Transactions
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Single Family Housing
PRICE ($1,000s) 91,905 467.933 468.073 0.110 28,031.170
BUILDING SQFT 91,905 2,058.075 938.180 10 15,300
BEDROOMS 91,905 3.366 0.921 1 12
BATHROOMS 91,905 1.512 0.650 1 7
SALE YEAR 91,905 2012.724 1.131 2010 2015
CONDO 91,905 0.000 0.000 0 0
Panel B: Condominium
PRICE ($1,000s) 24,559 632.618 2,575.069 0.117 26,260.000
BEDROOMS 24,559 1.894 0.654 1 8
BATHROOMS 24,559 1.480 0.527 1 6
SALE YEAR 24,559 2012.780 1.108 2010 2015
CONDO 24,559 1.000 0.000 1 1
Note: Square footage is not available for condominiums in the Seattle data.
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Table 5: Regression Results for Hedonic Model including the Modified K-function for Public
Disorder Crimes in Denver.
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 −0.13791∗∗ −0.02946∗∗ −0.00301∗∗
(−5.51534) (−5.6734) (−2.83067)
K90−180 −0.12891∗∗ −0.0202∗∗ −0.00023
(−5.15985) (−3.88023) (−0.20985)
R2 0.47941 0.48064 0.47629
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−180 −0.18672∗∗ −0.03929∗∗ −0.00391∗∗
(−6.48856) (−6.90703) (−3.62204)
K180−360 −0.08775∗∗ −0.0076 0.00109
(−3.00797) (−1.32391) −1.00615
R2 0.47971 0.48063 0.47627
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 −0.10765∗∗ −0.02716∗∗ −0.00457∗∗
(−3.95322) (−4.6602) (−3.71404)
K90−180 −0.09605∗∗ −0.01732∗∗ −0.00032
(−3.50595) (−2.94614) (−0.25554)
K180−270 −0.06945∗∗ −0.00773 −0.00319∗∗
(−2.56804) (−1.30656) (−2.52689)
K270−360 −0.02312 0.00133 0.00501∗∗
(−0.88849) (0.23476) (4.1553)
R2 0.47969 0.48069 0.47685
t - statistics in parentheses. ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 6: Regression Results for Hedonic Model including the Modified K-function for Theft
from Motor Vehicle crimes in Denver.
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 0.20318∗∗ 0.0413∗∗ 0.00973∗∗
(8.60116) (8.02603) (8.91793)
K90−180 0.13953∗∗ 0.02516∗∗ 0.00434∗∗
(5.88403) (5.03404) (4.08035)
R2 0.48211 0.48466 0.49274
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−180 0.19384∗∗ 0.02565∗∗ 0.0023∗
(6.80306) (4.42811) (1.92649)
K180−360 0.18596∗∗ 0.04314∗∗ 0.01134∗∗
(6.65018) (7.64095) (9.8995)
R2 0.48338 0.48622 0.49524
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 0.14506∗∗ 0.0249∗∗ 0.00482∗∗
(5.76696) (4.47273) (4.03477)
K90−180 0.0642∗∗ 0.00418 −0.00228∗
(2.4358) (0.72329) (−1.78891)
K180−270 0.05928∗∗ 0.00921 0.0015
(2.26984) (1.59994) (1.19858)
K270−360 0.1402∗∗ 0.03675∗∗ 0.01084∗∗
(5.45364) (6.65546) (9.21485)
R2 0.48356 0.48666 0.49627
t - statistics in parentheses. ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 7: Regression Results for Hedonic Model including the Modified K-function for Auto-
mobile Theft Crimes in Denver.
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 −0.13821∗∗ −0.02485∗∗ −0.00315∗∗
(−5.5945) (−4.48012) (−2.64062)
K90−180 −0.19372∗∗ −0.03863∗∗ −0.00483∗∗
(−7.71315) (−6.96689) (−4.05329)
R2 0.48121 0.48326 0.47997
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−180 −0.19144∗∗ −0.04414∗∗ −0.00991∗∗
(−6.24827) (−6.71323) (−7.29479)
K180−360 −0.17417∗∗ −0.01808∗∗ 0.0025∗
(−5.72385) (−2.81078) (1.88918)
R2 0.4823 0.4836 0.48031
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 −0.06796∗∗ −0.01474∗∗ −0.00361∗∗
(−2.51602) (−2.37205) (−2.66558)
K90−180 −0.11764∗∗ −0.02584∗∗ −0.00486∗∗
(−4.23643) (−3.99138) (−3.4142)
K180−270 −0.10977∗∗ −0.02758∗∗ −0.00458∗∗
(−3.92347) (−4.32404) (−3.26439)
K270−360 −0.10305∗∗ 0.001 0.00519∗∗
(−3.75102) (0.16114) (3.8670)
R2 0.48246 0.48389 0.48055
t - statistics in parentheses. ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 8: Regression Results for Hedonic Model including the Modified K-function for All
Crimes in Denver.
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 0.01717 0.0086 0.00444∗∗
(0.45637) (1.22361) (3.9687)
K90−180 −0.12518∗∗ −0.02355∗∗ −0.00164
(−3.32845) (−3.42628) (−1.51442)
R2 0.47617 0.47611 0.4764
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−180 −0.06065 −0.01511∗∗ 0.00059
(−1.66639) (−2.53201) (0.66144)
K180−360 −0.04398 0.00175 0.00198∗∗
(−1.22657) (0.30032) (2.31148)
R2 0.47611 0.47592 0.47629
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 0.04366 0.00597 0.00255∗
(1.02805) (0.71641) (1.79525)
K90−180 −0.0922∗∗ −0.02364∗∗ −0.00203∗
(−2.15176) (−3.13423) (−1.76235)
K180−270 −0.09226∗∗ −0.01002 −0.00142
(−2.27387) (−1.42876) (−1.31805)
K270−360 0.02601 0.01309∗ 0.00381∗∗
(0.64263) (1.83316) (3.40217)
R2 0.47633 0.47623 0.47676
t - statistics in parentheses. ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 9: Percentage Impact of a One Standard Deviation Increase of the K-function - Denver.
K function for Half mile Quarter mile
Total −1.88% −2.30%
Public Disorder −5.95% −5.85%
Theft from Auto 8.68% 8.14%
Automobile Theft −7.50% −7.63%
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Table 10: Regression Results for Hedonic Model including the Modified K-function for All
Crimes in Seattle.
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 −0.18959∗ 0.01645 0.01895∗∗
(−1.89527) (0.79338) (4.71084)
K90−180 −0.26105∗∗ −0.05026∗∗ −0.01453∗∗
(−2.63986) (−2.44829) (−3.6341)
R2 0.31255 0.31111 0.31141
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−180 −0.10472 0.02637 0.00474
(−0.89327) (1.1304) (1.05247)
K180−360 −0.34068∗∗ −0.05992∗∗ −0.00053
(−2.94772) (−2.59031) (−0.11898)
R2 0.31268 0.31117 0.311
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 −0.04241 0.04297∗ 0.01838∗∗
(−0.37732) (1.85795) (4.11248)
K90−180 −0.08943 −0.01908 −0.01624∗∗
(−0.76527) (−0.77434) (−3.34992)
K180−270 −0.09532 0.0026 0.01466∗∗
(−0.82511) (0.108) (3.14784)
K270−360 −0.24576∗∗ −0.06207∗∗ −0.01244∗∗
(−2.34807) (−2.8608) (−2.92659)
R2 0.31278 0.31135 0.31172
t - statistics in parentheses. ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 11: Regression Results for Hedonic Model including the Modified K-function for Public
Disorder Crimes in Seattle.
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 −0.42986∗∗ −0.04462∗∗ 0.00301
(−6.59421) (−2.94322) (0.93766)
K90−180 −0.33458∗∗ −0.04584∗∗ −0.00541∗
(−5.24848) (−3.11826) (−1.73534)
R2 0.31837 0.31564 0.31063
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−180 −0.37861∗∗ −0.04124∗∗ −0.00731∗
(−4.79431) (−2.28605) (−1.89376)
K180−360 −0.36831∗∗ −0.0442∗∗ 0.00509
(−4.76554) (−2.48445) (1.33458)
R2 0.31862 0.31561 0.31061
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 −0.28724∗∗ −0.03172∗ −0.00327
(−3.89892) (−1.82246) (−0.85368)
K90−180 −0.18455∗∗ −0.03394∗ −0.01212∗∗
(−2.48035) (−1.92415) (−3.17826)
K180−270 −0.08588 0.01615 0.01417∗∗
(−1.17789) (0.93229) (3.69815)
K270−360 −0.24066∗∗ −0.04166∗∗ −0.00122
(−3.57726) (−2.576) (−0.33762)
R2 0.31883 0.3158 0.31099
t - statistics in parentheses. ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 12: Regression Results for Hedonic Model including the Modified K-function for Theft
from Motor Vehicle Crimes in Seattle.
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 0.34909∗∗ 0.03582∗∗ 0.00583∗∗
(6.2418) (3.25672) (2.78173)
K90−180 0.39226∗∗ 0.0912∗∗ 0.01675∗∗
(7.24404) (8.45692) (8.01871)
R2 0.31542 0.31754 0.32285
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−180 0.31627∗∗ 0.01787 −0.00175
(4.96129) (1.4893) (−0.78264)
K180−360 0.56807∗∗ 0.12386∗∗ 0.02492∗∗
(9.17558) (10.47268) (11.26335)
R2 0.31757 0.3201 0.3258
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 0.15399∗∗ −0.01754 −0.0061∗∗
(2.57775) (−1.44839) (−2.60658)
K90−180 0.18146∗∗ 0.03622∗∗ 0.00408
(3.06199) (2.98606) (1.67534)
K180−270 0.28754∗∗ 0.06318∗∗ 0.01162∗∗
(4.87761) (5.29657) (4.88389)
K270−360 0.31613∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.01535∗∗
(5.80864) (6.19593) (6.96015)
R2 0.31747 0.32022 0.32607
t - statistics in parentheses. ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 13: Regression Results for Hedonic Model including the Modified K-function for Au-
tomobile Theft Crimes in Seattle.
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 −0.27251∗∗ −0.03773∗∗ 0.00102
(−6.29732) (−4.05668) (0.52082)
K90−180 −0.24949∗∗ −0.03574∗∗ −0.00354∗
(−5.71546) (−3.80782) (−1.77705)
R2 0.31404 0.31305 0.31051
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−180 −0.09499∗ 0.0413∗∗ 0.01719∗∗
(−1.81136) (3.81199) (7.82405)
K180−360 −0.58236∗∗ −0.13532∗∗ −0.02217∗∗
(−11.0951) (−12.26512) (−9.76834)
R2 0.31677 0.31637 0.31275
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 −0.08995∗ 0.01114 0.00919∗∗
(−1.93826) (1.09638) (4.25977)
K90−180 −0.03884 0.02622∗∗ 0.00775∗∗
(−0.81288) (2.43783) (3.29637)
K180−270 −0.35126∗∗ −0.06819∗∗ −0.00874∗∗
(−7.40134) (−6.38283) (−3.77138)
K270−360 −0.24889∗∗ −0.07264∗∗ −0.01403∗∗
(−5.57484) (−7.29746) (−6.59055)
R2 0.31685 0.31646 0.31263
t - statistics in parentheses. ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 14: Regression Results for Hedonic Model including the Modified K-function for All
Crimes in Seattle.
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 −0.18959∗ 0.01645 0.01895∗∗
(−1.89527) (0.79338) (4.71084)
K90−180 −0.26105∗∗ −0.05026∗∗ −0.01453∗∗
(−2.63986) (−2.44829) (−3.6341)
R2 0.31255 0.31111 0.31141
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−180 −0.10472 0.02637 0.00474
(−0.89327) (1.1304) (1.05247)
K180−360 −0.34068∗∗ −0.05992∗∗ −0.00053
(−2.94772) (−2.59031) (−0.11898)
R2 0.31268 0.31117 0.311
Variable 1/4 mile 1/2 mile 1 mile
K0−90 −0.04241 0.04297∗ 0.01838∗∗
(−0.37732) (1.85795) (4.11248)
K90−180 −0.08943 −0.01908 −0.01624∗∗
(−0.76527) (−0.77434) (−3.34992)
K180−270 −0.09532 0.0026 0.01466∗∗
(−0.82511) (0.108) (3.14784)
K270−360 −0.24576∗∗ −0.06207∗∗ −0.01244∗∗
(−2.34807) (−2.8608) (−2.92659)
R2 0.31278 0.31135 0.31172
t - statistics in parentheses. ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 15: Percentage Impact of a One Standard Deviation Increase of the K-function -
Seattle.
K function for Half mile Quarter mile
Total −1.81% −3.30%
Public Disorder −4.85% −6.47%
Theft from Auto 6.62% 6.84%
Automobile Theft −5.00% −6.26%
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Figure 1: Map of the K-function within Half of a Mile for Public Disorder Crimes in Denver.
27/29
Figure 2: Map of the K-function within Half of a Mile for Public Disorder Crimes in Seattle.
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Figure 3: Map of the K-function within Half of a Mile for Public Disorder Crimes in Denver
including the ZIP code limits.
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Figure 4: Map of the K-function within Half of a Mile for Public Disorder Crimes in Seattle
including the ZIP code limits.
